, Vol. 9, No. 1 (26) as the infringement of uniform application of the free movement of goods in the EU.
introduction
The European Union as a single market guarantees that goods placed on the market in one Member State shall move freely in other Member States. The free movement of goods is one of the fundamental freedoms of the European Union as a single market. The free movement of goods leads to an economic integration and sustainable development in the area (Avgoustis, 2012, pp. 108-121) . The free movement of goods was already instituted by the Treaty Establishing the European Community (2010). The same right was consolidated in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) where Articles 34-36 1 establish a prohibition of quantitative or similar restrictions on export and import between Member States:
The provisions of Articles 34 and 36 shall not preclude prohibitions or restrictions on imports, exports or goods in transit justified on grounds of […] the protection of industrial and commercial property. Such prohibitions or restrictions shall not, however, constitute a means of arbitrary discriminatory or a distinguished restriction on trade between Member States. (The Treaty Establishing the European Community, 2010)
Even though TFEU prohibits restrictions on free trade, restrictions can be applied to protect industrial and commercial property. Trade marks are treated as intellectual property and they are protected at the EU level.
2 Article 10 of Trade Mark Directive (2015 Directive ( /2436 establishes that "the proprietor of that registered trade mark shall be entitled to prevent all third parties not having his consent from using during trade, in relation to goods or services". Thus, on the one hand, trade mark rights are protected from the unlawful use of third parties, but, on the other hand, this could be treated as an obstacle to the free movement of goods. "Like any secondary legislation, however, the directive must be interpreted in the light of the Treaty rules on the free movement of goods" (Bristol-Myers Squibb v. Paranova A/S [1996] ). In order to reconcile these two rights, i.e. the 1 The numbering of articles in the EEC Treaty was changed in the TFEU. protection of a trade mark and free trade, "the exhaustion of rights doctrine" is applied, which means that if goods under the trade mark have been placed on the market in one Member State with the consent of the owner of the trade mark, traders may acquire these goods in one Member State and sell them in another Member State without infringing on the rights of the owner of the trade mark. At a basic level, the exhaustion of rights doctrine, also known as the "first sale doctrine" (Calboli, 2002, pp. 47-48) , prohibits the holder of an intellectual property right from exercising rights over a good or service once it is sold. The exhaustion of rights doctrine was established in Article 7 of the First Trade Mark Directive: " [t] he trade mark shall not entitle the proprietor to prohibit its use in relation to goods which have been put on the market in the Community under that trade mark by the proprietor or with his consent" (First Council Directive 89/104/EEC, pp. 1-7).
As " [t] he doctrine of exhaustion of trademarks is seen as a limitation to […] rights of the trademark proprietor" (Dobrin & Chochia, 2016, pp. 28-57 ) the problem lies in the different territories within which the doctrine is valid. For example, the exhaustion of rights doctrine can apply to national, regional and international level. Depending on the territorial level, product bearing the trade mark can be exhausted only in a specific territory. This could lead to the partitioning of national markets and restricting the trade between Member States of the EU. Therefore, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) through its jurisprudence and in line with Article 7 of the First Trade Mark Directive has clarified that the Community-wide exhaustion doctrine applies to the EU, i.e. regional level.
According to Advocate of the Court of Justice of the European Commission Nial Fennelly, the doctrine of Community exhaustion together with the notion of the specific subject-matter of each intellectual property were developed by the European Court of Justice in order to reconcile the conflict between Community free movement rules and national intellectual property rights (Fennelly, 2003, p. 33) .
As the main purpose and the primal specific subject-matter of the trade mark is to guarantee its origin, the problem can accur when functions of trade mark are extended. In this case, more activites of the parallel importer who repackages increase the risk of damaging the specific subject-matter of the trade mark (Gross, Harrold & Smith, 2002, pp. 497-503) . The ECJ has already "accepted that a trademark's communication, investment and advertising functions could be relevant to preventing the on-sale in the EEA of genuine goods. An analysis of the ECJ jurisprudence of the last two decades shows that the ECJ tends to extand the functions of the trade mark" (Robinson, Pratt & Kelly, 2013, p. 731) .
Since the ECJ was assigned "the difficult task of resolving issues resulting from the inherent complexities of the subject-matter and overcoming fundamental differencies in national attitudes toward the underlying objectives of trademark protection" (Malliaris, 2010, p. 45) , the balance between the free trade of goods and the protection of the trade mark was highlighted in numerous decisions of the ECJ.
The free movement of goods includes the parallel import of products. Parallel importers are treated as legal traders who acquire goods in one Member State and sell them in another Member State not through official distribution channels as the prices of goods in different Member States differ (Hays, 2004, p. 821) . In some cases, in order to enter another market, the necessity to repackage the product arises, e.g., to meet requirements of the local language or to change the size of the package. When repackaging the product, the issue of the infringement of the trade mark should also be dealt with. The balancing of the interest of parallel importers and the trade mark when repacking products has been taken into consideration in many ECJ cases and ECJ considers that "a trademark right cannot be asserted to prevent the entry of pharmaceuticals even when the importer purchases the right holder's product and repackages it for resale in another state" (Pfizer, Inc. v. Eurim-Pharm GmbH [1981] ). The ECJ has solved the tension between the owners of the trade mark and parallel importers in a series of decisions. "The European Court of Justice chose to favour the free movement of goods between member states at the expense of intellectual property rights" (Forrester & Nielson, 1997, pp. 11-37 In this respect, the owner of the trade mark cannot prevent the parallel importer from selling the pharmaceutical product which was put on the market in another Member State by the owner or with his consent, even if that importer repackaged the product and reaffixed the trade mark to it without the owner's authorisation. The ECJ explained that the parallel importer could repackage the pharmaceutical product and this would not constitute an infringement of the rights of the trade mark owner if all five BMS conditions were satisfied.
This article focuses on one sensitive aspect of repacking-does a parallel importer repackaging pharmaceutical products have the right to rebrand them using the trade mark that already exists in an export country? One the one hand, if parallel importers were allowed to rebrand freely without any restrictions, probably the rights of trade mark owners who invested in trademarks could be infringed. On the other hand, if rebranding was not permitted at all, this could constitute a hindrance to the free movement of goods (Hays, 2004, p. 821) . Thus, most conflicts between parallel importers and trade mark owners have been solved by the ECJ by providing principles, guidance and explanations. However, not all issues have been dealt with as some of them have been left for national courts to be determined. One of the five BMS conditions is objective necessity to repackage the product. Nonetheless, the concept of objective necessity has not been defined by the uniform legislation of the EU (Dryden & Middlemiss, 2003, pp. 82-89) ; therefore, a national court of each Member State may make a decision which is not harmonised with the decision of a court of another Member State. Having analysed the decisions of other Member States, in the case of Speciality European Pharma Ltd. v. Doncaster Pharmaceuticals Group Ltd & Anor [2015] , Lord Justice Floyd made a conclusion that "in any event, whilst entitled as decision to great respect, they are not binding on us". In the light of the above discussion, this article will analyse the jurisprudence of national courts and will draw up criteria under what circumstances parallel importers are entitled not only to repackage but also to rebrand the product. Criteria set in different Member States shall be compared and evaluated. As decisions of national courts have not been the focus of scholarly analysis so far, this paper could be of great help to practitioners.
the subjective criterion-the intention of the trade mark
proprietor of artificial partitioning of the market It should be also noted that in some countries the Cyrillic alphabet is used. So, the manufacture and the marketing authorisation holder may decide to use a different trade mark for the same product. In its first decision regarding the rebranding of pharmaceutical products, the ECJ not only stated that the third parties cannot affix a trade mark but it also emphasised that if a manufacturer intends to partition the market artificially, the hindrance to use a trade mark by the third parties cannot be grounded. However, the Court pointed out that in some cases rebranding could be justified. Thus, the subjective criterion was determined. A parallel importer must prove that a trade mark owner created a few trade marks in different countries in order to partition the market artificially. For example, the use of a different package size is a common practice, which contributes to a partitioning of the markets, particularly in countries where national rules authorise only packages of particular size (Seville, 2016, p. 424 The Court's initial approach to repacking was based entirely on the interpretation of the EC Treaty and relevant case law. Since these earlier cases were decided, the Trade Mark Directive has come into force, requiring significant harmonisation of national trade mark law (Seville, 2016, p. 425) , "here the court appears to contemplate a subjective test where that conduct consists of having different trade marks for different Member States" (Norman, 2014, p. 452) .
Even though the ECJ stated that it is permitted for manufacturers to use different trade marks in the Member States, this could lead to an artificial partitioning of single markets, which could be treated as an obstacle for free trade and could be treated as a legal ground for rebranding. Consequently, the question has been left open and national courts have been authorised to determine whether there is an artificial partitioning of the market when selling the same products under different trade marks or not. This was the first time when the ECJ decided in its jurisprudence that there exists a possibility to replace a trade mark with another trade mark if it is deemed necessary. The Court emphasised that a parallel importer is entitled to rebrand the product if otherwise effective access to the market would be hindered. The necessity shall be decided by national courts. But, in any case, the ECJ provided a legal ground for the replacement of trade marks. Thus, it is not prohibited, as rebranding does not constitute the infringement of a trade mark owner's rights. The ECJ extended the same rule to the right to repack a parallel imported product and to replace the trade mark if it is necessary. Every country in the EU determines the criterion of necessity for rebranding.
the right to rebrand pharmaceutical products due to objective necessity
Even though the decision regarding the five conditions was intended for the repacking and naming of a product, in the case of rebranding, a parallel importer must also satisfy all these five conditions. The trade mark owner may not object to the rebranding of products if effective access to the market cannot be reached without it. Also, rebranding might be necessary if there is a possibility for a parallel importer to be excluded even from a part of the market.
The ECJ have made a lot of decisions in order to solve tensions between parallel importers and trade mark owners. For the first time, rebranding of pharmaceutical products was taken into consideration in the case Centrafarm BV v. American Home Products Corporation, where the Court stated that rebranding is not allowed unless owners of trade marks intend to partition the market artificially.
In the second rebranding case Pharmacia & Upjohn SA v. Paranova A/S, the ECJ stated that rebranding is allowed if there exists objective necessity. However, the ECJ has not set a clear criterion as to when rebranding would be justified. It seems that the ECJ is concerned by the manufacturer's ability to protect its trademark or to invest in it. In addition, the courts of appeal can more positively assess the position of the manufacturer that different packages of medicine are not intended to create barriers to parallel imports, but rather serve as a strategy for brand capitalisation for local markets (Bird & Chaudhry, 2010, p. 719) . Consumers' hostility towards a particular drug practice, for example, the packaging of a medicine is over-labeled, or the attitude against a particular name can be recognised as a legitimate basis for repackaging, i.e. the criterion of objective necessity would be proven (Fuhrmeister, 2008) .
Consequently, this question has been left for national courts of the Member States. The national courts of the Member States are not bound to adopt similar decisions according to the same factual circumstances. National courts are independent and it could happen that a court of one Member State decides that necessity exits, whereas a court of another Member State comes to a conclusion that there is no necessity to rebrand a product. These different evaluations of the necessity criterion could mean that the TFEU fundamental articles of the free movement of goods are applied in different ways, but, in other cases, this could condition hindrances to the free movement of goods. In the light of the above discussion, the following part of the paper focuses on the comparison of decisions of national courts. In addition, different criteria are presented which could be treated as objective necessity to rebrand pharmaceutical products. Thus, first of all, the parallel importer Orifarm could not use the trade mark Madopar 62.5 Dispersible, because the suffix 62.5 Dispersible was not allowed. However, the parallel importer must rebrand the product. The Court evaluated other theoretical possibilities to rebrand the product. The name Madopar could not be used either because it had been already taken for another prescription drug with a different content and composition of different pharmaceutical form, and with different routes of administration. Another alternative to use Madopar with a different suffix could meet a consumers' resistance and could confuse them to use another suffix for the same products. In Roche AB v Orifarm AB [2006] , the Court stated that even though at the first glance it seemed that nobody could reaffix the other proprietor's trade mark, but, under objective necessity, this could be allowed. The Court examined the necessity criterion and decided that the necessity criterion had been met because the rules in the importing Member State prevented the marketing of the product with the trade mark from the exporting Member State. The usage of another trade mark could infringe on the rights of consumers and health care. (ISSN 2228-0588) , Vol. 9, No. 1 (26) 
rebranding on the grounds that a trade mark from an export country is not allowed in an import country
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rebranding on the grounds that a trade mark in an export country could be confused with a trade mark in an import country
The conflictual situation was handled in the case of Roche v. Paranova [2001] by the National Swedish Court. The facts of the case are as follows: Hoffman-La Roche sold a pharmaceutical under the trade mark Alganex in Sweden and under the trade mark Tilcotil in Spain. Paranova acquired pharmaceutical products in Spain named Tilcotil and rebranded it to Alganex and started selling them in Sweden. Hoffman-La Roche applied to the court due to the infringement on trade mark rights. The Court decided that the rebranding had been necessary because Tilcotil could be confused with an earlier registered trade mark in Sweden, Tiotil. Without rebranding, the parallel importer could not enter the Swedish market, so it was held objectively necessary to rebrand the product.
The ECJ stated a plain condition according to which rebranding is allowed in the case of the existence of objective necessity. National courts handling particular cases must evaluate whether objective necessity exits. Only when the parallel importer cannot enter the market with an original trade mark, the change of the trade mark is allowed. One of the objective reasons to change an original trade mark is when this trade mark could be confused with an earlier registered trade mark in the import country, because, without changing the trade mark, the consumers could be misled and this could jeopardise public health.
A similar situation took place in Germany. According to facts of the Zantag/ Zantig [2002] case, the plaintiff sold medicine for the regulation of gastric acid secretion named Zantac in Austria and other countries and under the name Zantic in Germany, because the trade mark Santax was already used in Germany and could confuse consumers as these trademarks seem similar. The defendant acquired medicine Zantac 150 Mg Film Tablets from Austria, repacked them and rebranded them to the trade mark Zantic 150 Film Tablets and sold in Germany. The Court pointed out that it is important to evaluate the objective situation why the trade mark owner could not use the trade mark Zantac in Germany. The trade mark Zantac had been rejected in Germany because of the earlier trade mark Santax, so the same reasons would have hindered the defendant from the usage of Zantac. In order to evaluate whether the defendant was allowed to rebrand the product, objective necessity should have been taken into consideration. If the defendant-the parallel importer-could not have entered the German market without changing the trade mark, this could have been treated as the necessity to rebrand. Had a parallel importer been prohibited to change a trade mark, it would not have entered the German market. The hindrance to the use of an original trade mark does not exist solely because a manufacturer uses a different trade mark. In the discussed case, an earlier domestic trade mark Santax precluded the marketing of the medicinal product under the trade mark of the state of origin Zantac, so the defendant was allowed to change the trade mark to Zantic.
The practices of the national courts of Sweden and Germany are similar. If a trade mark from an export country could be confused with an already existing trade mark in an import country, this could be treated as objective necessity to rebrand the product.
a parallel importer's entry into the full market
6.1 An artificial partitioning of the market excluded a parallel importer from the submarket of the same product, Klacid pro, only with a different dosage of the first day
The applicant, a pharmaceutical company, markets the medicines Klacid and Klacid Pro in Germany. The medicines are antibiotics containing the active substance clarithromycin. In Spain, the product is sold under the name Klacid 250 Comprimidos. The medicinal product Klacid Pro is distributed exclusively in Germany. The medicinal products Klacid and Klacid Pro have an identical composition and indication, and are intended for the same patient group. They differ only in the dosage instructions for the first day of ingestion, and the package is different as well. Selling Klacid Pro yields larger profit.
The defendants in the Klacid PRO [2008] case were parallel importers of medicinal products. They imported the medicinal product Klacid 250
Comprimidos from Spain and sold them in Germany under the rebranded name Klacid Pro. The Federal Court allowed rebranding because it was an artificial partitioning of the market. An artificial market partitioning is to be expected when a medicinal product is marketed in the Member State of export only with a dosing notice and in the importing Member State under different trade marks with different dosing instructions. The parallel importer is thus excluded from one of the submarkets by distributing the identical medicinal product with different brands and dosage indications in the importing Member State. The drugs marketed under the names Klacid and Klacid Pro in Germany are identical in their composition and indication. They are also intended for the same patient group without any differences. They differ only in dosage instructions. By restricting the distribution of Klacid Pro to Germany, the parallel importer is (ISSN 2228-0588) , Vol. 9, No. 1 (26) prevented from the distribution of a correspondingly designated medicinal product with double dosage on the first day without the use of the brand name. The exclusion from this submarket justifies the assumption of an artificial market partitioning without the possibility of Klacid of the Spanish origin being marketed domestically under the designation.
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6.2 a parallel importer's access to the full market including submarkets of less than 10 percent of regurin trade mark market when the rebranding of a product with the trademark owner's mark will not be considered necessary to access the UK market and therefore lawful. The value of a trademark owner's rights in a parallel import situation continues its steady decline" (Gilbert, Wilson & Waller, 2015) . If read in isolation, the provisions of the TM Directive and CTM Regulation would provide the plaintiff, in circumstances such as these, with a straightforward infringement claim (INTA, 2017, p. 607 Doncaster could not compete with generic products as generic products were much cheaper, also they could not get the market of Regurin if they were named under Trospium Chloride. Finally, it would not be realistic that doctors would prescribe Doncaster trade mark, so it was decided that it was necessary to rebrand the product. The Court explained that 8.61% of the market was deemed substantial and rebranding was allowed:
The decision rested on a detailed analysis how the English market operates (INTA, 2016, p. 611 (ISSN 2228-0588) , Vol. 9, No. 1 (26) irrelevant that most prescription practices in Sweden are based on the brand name.
In a similar case of Orifarm A/S, Orifarm Supply A/S v. Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp, Merck Sharp & Dohme B.V. [2014] , in Denmark, three companies in the Merck group (hereinafter referred to as Merck) claimed inter alia that the parallel importer Orifarm was unentitled to market Merck's medicinal product in Denmark under the trademark Cozaar. The Maritime and Commercial Court assessed whether circumstances on the Danish market prevented Orifarm from marketing the product under the name Loortan, which was the name applied to the product by Merck in the export state. Thus, the Court assessed whether Orifarm's relabeling from Loortan to Cozaar was legitimate. The facts of the case showed that the product was marketed and sold on the Danish market under both the Danish trademark Cozaar and the Italian trade mark Lortaan. Furthermore, the data showed that the sale of the product under non-Danish trademarks in numbers was nearly as large as the sale under the Danish trade mark Cozaar. Consequently, the Court found that relabeling was not objectively necessary for Orifarm's effective access to the Danish market and relabeling was, therefore, an infringement of Merck's trade mark rights. The consequence of the decision is that a parallel importer cannot invoke the condition of necessity in the support of relabeling a parallel-imported medicinal product if the actual sales show that it has actually been possible in the import state to market the product under a trademark other than that of the manufacturer's. Due to the facts in the case, including the evidence relating to the actual sale, the Maritime and Commercial Court did not get the opportunity to rule on whether the relabelling could have been deemed objectively necessary for the effective access to the market if no actual sale had occurred in Denmark under another trademark than the manufacturer's.
In principle, a parallel importer might successfully claim objective necessity where the patient group and the doctors are reluctant to purchase, ingest and/or prescribe the medicinal product under a trademark other than the one used by the original manufacturer in Denmark (Orifarm A/S, Orifarm Supply A/S v. Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp, Merck Sharp & Dohme B.V. [2014] ).
When comparing these three cases from the UK, Sweden and Denmark, the factual circumstances look very similar. The parallel importer wanted to rebrand in order to get assets. Even though the prescription was according to the trade mark, the parallel importer could not enter the market of Limovane, but this was not treated as an obstacle and objective necessity to rebrand. Thus, it is obvious that the decisions of the Member States' national courts, when interpreting the same EU Treaty, the same Trade Mark Directive, applying the same ECJ decisions and evaluating objective necessity to rebrand, come to different conclusions. Uniformity could be achieved only if the ECJ will give an autonomous meaning to objective necessity criterion; otherwise, courts of different countries might come to different decisions.
conclusions
In 1978, the ECJ decided for the first time that rebranding could be allowed due to a subjective criterion. In the case Centrafarm BV v. American Home Product Corporation, the ECJ stated that rebranding could be allowed if the proprietor of different trade marks used these marks for the purpose of an artificial partitioning of the market.
In the second case Pharmacia & Upjohn SA v. Paranova A/ [1999] ECJ, the decision was made, according to which there could exist a possibility to replace a trade mark with another trade mark due to objective necessity. The Court emphasised that rebranding is permissible if effective access to the market would be hindered otherwise. But the necessity criterion should be also determined by the national courts of the Member States.
National courts are independent. In some cases, objective necessity is determined on similar grounds such as the existence of a trade mark in an export country (for example, Santax, Tiotil) which could be confused with a trade mark from an import country (for example, Zantac, Tilcotil).
But it could also happen that the court of one Member State states the existence of necessity, whereas the court of another Member State decides that the necessity to rebrand does not exist. Such different evaluations of the necessity criterion could mean that the TFEU fundamental articles of the free movement of goods are applied in different ways, and in some cases, this could constitute hindrances to the free movement of goods. A different interpretation is seen in the decision made by the UK Court regarding the rebranding of the product from Ceris and Urivest to Regurin, which was treated as objective necessity even though the market was 8.61%, while in similar decisions by the courts in Sweden it was not allowed to rebrand the product from Limove to Imovane and in Denmark it was allowed to rebrand the product from Loortan to Cozaar. It is obvious that the decisions of courts interpreting the same Treaty, the same Directive and applying the same ECJ decision would come to different conclusions. There
